Cornell Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 6 July 1969

Article 8

Informer’s Tip as Probable Cause for Search or
Arrest
Henry S. Mather

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Henry S. Mather, Informer’s Tip as Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 Cornell L. Rev. 958 (1969)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol54/iss6/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE INFORMER'S TIP AS PROBABLE CAUSE
FOR SEARCH OR ARREST
An informer's tip' provides constitutionally adequate grounds for
arrest or search, whether with or without a warrant, 2 only if it affords
1 See generally M. HARNEY AND J. CRoss, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1962),
providing examples showing the informer's tip to be a necessary tool of law enforcement.
2 Although courts encourage the use of warrants, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
270-71 (1960), both arrests and searches, are possible without warrant. A warrantless arrest
for a felony is valid if based upon probable cause. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
479 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959). Warrantless arrest for a
misdemeanor requires commission in the officer's presence. Carrol v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 156-57 (1925) (dictum). A warrantless search is permitted either where probable
cause is present and it is impracticable to obtain a warrant, id. at 156, or where the
search is incidental to a lawful arrest. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950). A
good analysis of both warrantless search situations is contained in United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 n.2 (1965). Since a warrantless search is incidental to lawful
arrest only if there was probable cause for the arrest, all searches and arrests must
ultimately be based on some probable cause.
The definition of probable cause is the same regardless of whether a warrant is used.
See, e.g., Draper v. United States, supra, applying to a warrantless arrest the probable cause
test applied to a warrantless search in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); McCray
v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967), applying to a warrantless arrest the same test as was
applied to a search warrant in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
To encourage the use of warrants, a "probable cause" standard might be used for
warrant cases and a "very probable cause" standard for warrantless cases, but a multiplicity
of standards would probably resemble the different degrees of negligence, which analytically
at least are semantic nonsense. A more useful method, enunciated by Justice Goldberg in
United States v. Ventresca, supra, is to make a presumption in favor of probable cause if
a warrant has issued and against probable cause if no warrant has issued:
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270, this Court, strongly supporting
the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, indicated that in a
doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fail.
Id. at 106. Justice Goldberg is arguably twisting Jones. Where Goldberg creates a presumption against warrantless searches in close cases, Jones merely states that more evidence
should not be required for a search warrant than for a warrantless search, and that "[iln a
doubtful case, when the officer does not have clearly convincing evidence of the immediate
need to search, it is most important that resort be had to a warrant .... " 362 U.S. at 270.
Furthermore, Justice Goldberg's use of presumptions may make it harder to sustain a
warrant than does Jones. Logically, it would seem that a warrant could more easily be
upheld under the "substantial basis" test (where a substantial basis would be conclusive)
than under the Goldberg judicial review technique (where the warrant gains the benefit
of presumptive validity only in close cases). But the difference may be only semantic. See
United States v. Ventresca, supra, which uses both tests without differentiation. Nevertheless the Goldberg approach is a sensible way to encourage warrants without trying to
define a double standard, and there is precedent for his position. See Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
In both cases warrantless searches were invalidated with indications that they would have
been sustained if under warrant. The Goldberg theory is repeated in Aguilar v. Texas,
supra.
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"probable cause." Probable cause exists when a police officer has personal knowledge or reasonably trustworthy reports of facts that are
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious man's believing that an
offense has been or is being committed.- In the context of informers'
tips, then, the problem is to distinguish those tips that are "reasonably
trustworthy" from those that are not. The Supreme Court devised a
fairly clear, albeit rigorous, test in Aguilar v. Texas,5 but subsequent
decisions, especially Spinelli v. United States,6 have both confused the
Aguilar test and made unsatisfactory alterations to it.
I
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TRUSTWORTHY

Tip

In Aguilar, a search warrant for narcotics issued upon an affidavit
reciting merely that the affiant police officer had received "reliable information from a credible person" and believed narcotics were kept at
the described premises for purposes of illegal sale.7 The search produced
evidence resulting in conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the conAnother way to encourage the use of warrants would be for the Supreme Court to
hold that under the fourteenth amendment the prosecution has the burden at trial of
proving probable cause in a warrantless case. This is the rule in federal courts, but it does
not yet extend to the states, some of which put the burden of proving lack of probable
cause in warrantless cases on the defendant. See Quinn, McCray v. Illinois: Probable Cause
and the Informer Privilege, 45 DENVER L.J. 399, 411 n.57' (1968). Although the burden of
proof may not be fundamental enough to deserve due process treatment, such treatment
may be necessary to encourage warrants.
3 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONSr. amend. IV. The probable cause requirement is the same under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964); Kerr v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Even though an informer's tip constitutes hearsay inadmissable at trial, it can still
be sufficient to establish probable cause. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960);
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.

160, 172-74 (1949).
4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). See also Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949).
The requirements for probable cause are thus less than the requirements for guilt.
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,
311-12 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, supra.
5 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
6 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
7 378 U.S. at 109. The magistrate apparently had only the affidavit upon which to
base his decision to issue the warrant. A reviewing court can consider only information
brought to the magistrate's attention. Id. at 109 n.l.
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viction, holding the warrant invalid under the fourteenth amendment
because the affidavit failed both parts of a two-part test:
[T]he magistrate must be informed of [1] some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and [2] some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant.., was "credible" or his information "reliable." 8
The first test, the basis of knowledge test,9 demands that the informer have obtained his knowledge by personal observation or in
some other dependable manner rather than through casual rumor. It
can be rephrased in terms of the magistrate's first question to the police
officer or, in a warrantless case, the police officer's first question to himself: "How does the informer know there are narcotics in this house?"
The second test, the reliability test, guards against tips provided by
untruthful or unreliable informers. It can be rephrased in terms of the
magistrate's or police officer's second question: "Why should we believe
this particular informer?" This second test speaks of two possibilitiesa "credible" informant or "reliable" information. This distinction suggests that an informant is credible if he has provided truthful tips in
the past, and that the information is reliable if corroborated by independent investigation. 10
Both tests require only that some of the underlying circumstances
be sworn to. The opinion does not state how many or what type of circumstances are sufficient -and thus leaves much to the magistrate's or
police officer's judgment. Yet the dual requirement was criticized in
Justice Clark's dissent as overly rigid and technical."' To evaluate the
Aguilar test, the alternatives presented in subsequent cases should be
examined.
In United States v. Ventr'esca,12 a search warrant issued upon an
affidavit reciting that the request for a search warrant was based on
"observations made by [affiant, an Internal Revenue Service investiga-

8 Id. at

114 (footnote omitted).

9 The Aguilar basis of knowledge test may only have been a clear expression-in
the informer's tip context--of an already-existing requirement that any allegation of
criminal activity be supported by a basis of knowledge statement. See, e.g., Nathanson v.
United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
1o The Aguilar opinion cited the affidavit in Jones v. United States, 862 U.S. 257
(1960), as sufficient. That affidavit contained sworn statements (1) that the informer had
given accurate tips on previous occasions, and (2) that the tip was corroborated by
information from other informers. Aguilar fails to cearly indicate whether either statement alone is sufficient to fulfill the reliability test. 378 U.S. at 114-15 n.5.
11 Id. at 122.

12 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
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tor], and . . . upon information received officially from other Investigators attached to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division . , .
and reports orally made to [affiant] describing the results of their
observations and investigation . . . ." The affidavit also recited
that investigators had smelled mash while walking near Ventresca's
house and had heard sounds, like those of a motor, coming from the
house.1 3 A search made under the warrant led to an illegal still, and4
Ventresca was convicted. The court of appeals reversed the conviction.1
It concluded that the affidavit failed the Aguilar basis of knowledge
test because it did not expressly state that the information was based on
the personal knowledge of affiant or other investigators; thus, the information obtained from the other investigators could have been based
on unreliable hearsay. 15
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and sustained
the conviction." Justice Goldberg wrote that affidavits for search
warrants must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a
common sense, realistic fashion; technical requirements have no place
in this area of the law.' The opinion indicates that the affidavit, viewed
realistically, passed each of the Aguilar tests. Since IRS investigators are
presumed to be truthful,'8 a statement that information came from IRS
investigators satisfies the reliability test. The basis of knowledge test is
met because at least some of the information was stated to be derived
from the observations of other investigators, and the smell of mash and
sounds of a motor were explicitly stated to be personal observations of
investigators. 19
The opinion lacks, however, a clear affirmation of the necessity to
apply both Aguilar tests. Its emphasis on the desirability of a commonsense, non-technical approach produces uncertainty as to whether
Aguilar must be applied literally or whether one or both of its dual
requirements can be ignored if common sense indicates that a tip pro20
vides probable cause.
13 Id. at 103-04.
14 324 F.2d 864 (Ist Cir. 1963).
15 Id. at 868-70.
16 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
17 Id. at 108.
18 Id. at 111.
19 Id. at 110, 111.
20 Justice Goldberg probably meant only that common sense should be used in
determining whether sufficient circumstances have been set forth to pass each of the tests
required by Aguilar. But some courts have used Ventresca to justify the failure to apply both
Aguilar tests. For example, in People V. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y.2d 457, 223 N.E.2d 28, 276
N.Y.S.2d 28 (1966), an affidavit for a search warrant recited that an informer had seen
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This confusion is apparent in Spinelli v. United States.2 ' Here a
search under warrant produced evidence that was used to convict defendant of interstate gambling. The warrant was issued upon an affidavit reciting the following information: Federal Bureau of Investigation agents had four times seen Spinelli drive from Illinois to St. Louis
and enter a specific apartment building, and on one occasion they had
seen Spinelli enter a particular apartment. The FBI had learned from
the telephone company that the apartment contained two telephones
listed in another's name. The FBI-had been "informed by a... reliable
informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting
wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of [these]
telephones ... .,,22 Spinelli was known to the affiant and other law en23
forcement agents as a gambler.
Justice Harlan's opinion for a four-man majority invalidated the
warrant. Applying the basis of knowledge test, he noted that the affidavit lacked any explanation of the underlying circumstances from
which the informer concluded Spinelli was running a gambling operation. There was no allegation that the informer had seen Spinelli at
work or had placed a bet with him. 24 Nor was there a statement that

the informer had obtained his information from another reliable
25
source.
Justice Harlan indicated, however, that the purpose of the Aguilar
basis of knowledge test could be fulfilled without a statement of the
circumstances from which the informer derived his information. He
suggested that if the tip was sufficiently detailed, it would be self-verifying; one could fairly conclude that the informer was not relying on
mere rumor. 26 The tip in question failed this alternative test. The only
narcotics delivered to defendant's apartment. The affiant police officer failed to state
circumstances showing why the informer was believed reliable, merely swearing that he
was reliable. Chief Judge Desmond, for a 4-3 majority, relied on Ventresca and upheld the
warrant. Judge Keating, in dissent, argued that the affidavit failed to pass the Aguilar
reliability test.
The Schnitzler decision would be wrong today, for there was no corroboration to help
the affidavit over the Aguilar reliability hurdle. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). See pp. 963-64 infra.
21 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
22 Id. at 422.
23 Id. at
24 Id. at

413, 414
416.
25 Id. This indicates that multiple hearsay can afford probable cause so long as the
Aguilar tests are met.
26 Id. at 416, 417. This was dearly a departure from Aguilar, which required a statement as to the informer's basis of knowledge and lacked any provision for the self-verifying
detail substitute suggested by Justice Harlan. See pp. 964-66 infra.
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fact it supplied was that defendant used two specified telephones, allegedly to conduct a gambling operation, and Justice Harlan observed
that this allegation could easily have been based on a conversation over27
heard by the informer at a neighborhood bar.
Moving to the Aguilar reliability test, Justice Harlan noted that
the affidavit gave no reason for believing the informer reliable. There
was a bald assertion of reliability but no mention of previous tips. 28
But Justice Harlan then went on to consider "the other allegations
which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report,"29
to determine whether "the tip, . . . when certain parts of it have been
corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which
would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration. ' 30 Since
only one fact-the phone numbers-had been corroborated, there was
31
insufficient corroboration to establish the informer's reliability.
The notion that corroboration of a tip can establish the informer's
reliability is derived from Draper v. United States.3 2 There the FBI's
informer (1) stated that Draper would arrive in Denver on the train
from Chicago on the eighth or ninth of September, (2) described
Draper's appearance and how he would be dressed, (3) stated that
Draper walked with a fast gait, (4) stated that he would be carrying
a tan zipper bag, and (5) stated that he would be carrying three ounces
393 U.S. at 417.
28 Id. at 416. In using past tips to establish reliability, a mere assertion that the
informer has given truthful tips on previous occasions is sufficient. The previous occasions
need not be enumerated. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 268-69 (1960).
27

29 393 U.S. at 415.
30 Id. Justice Harlan apparently assumed that the Aguilar reliability test could only
be met by a statement that the informer was known to be reliable (for example, because
of previous tips), but that corroboration might validate an affidavit failing that test. Yet,
as pointed out at p. 960 supra, Aguilar itself may have provided for corroboration as a means
of justifying the inferential conclusion that the informer was reliable. Thus, while Justice
Harlan viewed corroboration as a substitute for passing the Aguilar reliability test, it
might well be considered simply an additional way of passing it.
The quote from Justice Harlan's opinion may indicate that he also viewed corroboration as a means of passing the basis of knowledge test. But as Justice White points out in
his concurring opinion, 393 U.S. at 427, corroboration should not be considered in applying
this test. Independent corroboration of some of the facts alleged by the informer may
indicate truthfulness; i.e., that the tip is not completely fabricated, but does not suggest
that the informer's knowledge was obtained through personal observation or other
dependable manner.
31 393 U.S. at 417, 418. Justice Harlan then undertook a further analysis to see if the
affidavit, completely apart from the tip, presented probable cause; he concluded that none
of the other elements-Spinelli's entry into the apartment, the presence of two phones
listed in another name, Spinelli's reputation as a gambler-had probative value. Id. at
418, 419.
32 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:958

of heroin,33 By waiting for Draper at the Denver station, an FBI agent
was able to corroborate all but the fifth allegation. He arrested Draper
and, in a warrantless search pursuant to the arrest, found the heroin.
The Supreme Court found probable cause, the tip having been rendered trustworthy by the corroboration of so many of its alleged facts
34
and by the informer's having given accurate tips on previous occasions.
II
THE LIMITED EFFICACY OF SELF-VERIFYING

DETAIL AND INDEPENDENT CORROBORATION
A. Self-Verifying Detail as a Substitute for the Aguilar Basis of
Knowledge Test
In Spinelli, Justice Harlan asserted that a tip may be so detailed as
to be "self-verifying," on the ground that extensive detail may imply
that the informer has based his conclusion on personal observation. 5
But Spinelli offers little guidance for determining when a tip is detailed
enough to be self-verifying.
One possible criterion is the number of facts alleged. In a hypothetical situation R, a reliable informer who has provided accurate tips
in the past, states (1) that D uses apartment 600 as a business office;
(2) that D uses telephones WAger 2-0007 and WAger 2-0008 in his
business; and (3) that D's business is illegal bookmaking. A magistrate
33 Id. at

._

309.

34 Id. at 312-18.
Justice White, concurring in Spinelli, suggested that Aguilar may have overruled
Draper.393 U.S. at 427-29. Aguilar, a warrant case, required that the affidavit contain a statement as to the informer's basis of knowledge and a statement evidencing the informer's
reliability. In a warrantless case, Aguilar would presumably require that the officer conducting the search or arrest (1) know that the informer's basis of knowledge was sound
(preferably personal observation) and (2) have good reason to believe the infofmer reliable.
Draper, a warrantless case decided before Aguilar, held that there was probable cause
because (1) the informer had given accurate information in the past and (2) four of
the five facts alleged by the informer were corroborated by the FBI agent before making
the arrest, The DraperCourt appeared to treat both factors as reasons for believing the
informer reliable but showed no visible concern with a basis of knowledge test. Thus,
Draper is arguably incompatible with Aguilar, but the Draper opinion is really too brief
to indicate the Court's reasoning. In Spinelli, both Justices Harlan and White believed
the Draper tip contained self-verifying detail sufficient to infer an adequate basis of
knowledge. Thus, under Spinelli, the Draper decigion is sound as applied tb its facts. See
note 9 supra.
35 393 US. at 416, 417.
Although Justice Harlan announced that he would look for "corroboration" when
h at the details alleged in the tip be corroborated by independent police investigation. Id.
tihe Aguilar tests were not literally met, this self-verification substitute does not require]
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is asked to issue a search warrant, is told about the previous tips, but is
not told how the informer obtained the knowledge related in this tip.
Is the tip, with three facts alleged, detailed enough to be self-verifying?
Justice Harlan concluded that the Spinelli tip was not self-verifying
because it alleged only the phone numbers and the gambling, but that
the Draper tip was self-verifying because it alleged time of arrival at
Denver station, appearance, and amount of heroin.3 6 Surely, however,
the number of facts alleged cannot be determinative. A well-developed
rumor or a casual conversation is as likely to contain three facts as two.
A second possible criterion involves the question, "How would
such knowledge ordinarily be obtained?" In another hypothetical
situation R, again shown by past tips to be reliable, (1) states that D
uses apartment 600 as an office, (2) describes the apartment in great
detail, locating every piece of furniture, including a desk, and (3)
alleges that D keeps illegal gambling books locked in the desk.3 7 Is this
tip self-verifying? Justice Harlan believed the Draper tip was selfverifying because only a person who acquired his information in a
dependable manner would possess the informer's detailed knowledge
of Draper's appearance and time of arrival.38 But this does not mean
that the information about the heroin was obtained in the same manner. The informer might easily have met Draper at the Denver station
as Draper was about to leave for Chicago, heard Draper say he would
return in a day or two, observed that Draper carried no luggage except
a small zipper bag, and that evening overheard a rumor that Draper
was going to Chicago to buy heroin. Likewise, in the last hypothetical,
R has undoubtedly visited apartment 600 himself; otherwise he would
have been unable to describe it so precisely. But R's only basis for his
assertion that D keeps gambling books in his desk may be a rumor to
that effect. The detailed description of the apartment alone is a poor
substitute for the Aguilar requirement of a statement of the informer's
basis of knowledge.
The difficulty with the tip in the last hypothetical suggests a third
criterion for self-verifying detail: Are the facts detailed in the tip incriminating facts or merely innocent facts? 39 In the last hypothetical,
the situation would have been different if R had described the gambling
books in great detail and given their precise location in the desk. 40
36 Id. at 417, 418.

37 The hypothetical is based on one of Justice White's. Id. at 427,
38 Id. at 417 (Harlan, J.), 425, 426 (White, J., concurring).
30 This distinction is suggested in Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable
Cause in the Federal Co4rts, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 840, 843-44 n.22 (1965).
40 This situation is suggested by another of Justice White's hypotheticals. 393 U.S.

at 425.
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The location of the furniture in the apartment involves mere innocent
facts, but the description of the gambling books involves incriminating
facts. Detailed knowledge of the apartment furniture does not indicate
that the information about the gambling books was obtained through
personal observation, but the detailed description of the books themselves is probably based upon personal observation. Such a tip seems
to be self-verifying; the incriminating detail is the substantial equivalent of passing the Aguilar basis of knowledge test.
The best solution to the problems of the self-verifying detail test may
be the one suggested by Justice White: abandon it and return to a literal
application of Aguilar. Although he agreed with Justice Harlan that a
detailed tip may be self-verifying, Justice White, concurring in Spinelli,
argued that where it may be so easily inferred from the affidavit that
the informer observed the facts himself, "no... harm could come from
requiring a statement to that effect, thereby removing the difficult...
questions which arise in such situations." 41 This suggestion appears
sound. In a warrantless situation, the policeman can more easily and
surely decide whether he has probable cause to make an arrest or
search by asking himself, "Do I know how the informer got his information," than he can by asking, "Is this tip so detailed as to be selfverifying?" Where a magistrate is being asked to issue a warrant, he
cannot question the informer to determine whether the tip is based on
rumor. The police officer who interviews the informer can, however.
It seems senseless to force the magistrate to rely on a possibly incorrect
inference from the detailed nature of the tip when the officer could
make a statement as to the basis of knowledge. Since it is unlikely that
forcing an informer to reveal his source of information will substantially impede law enforcement, 42 the self-verifying test is an unnecessary
and complicated alternative to Aguilar that could be dispensed with.
B. Independent Corroborationas a Substitute for the Aguilar
Reliability Test
Whether independent corroboration is viewed as a way to pass
43
the Aguilar reliability test or as a substitute for passing that test,
Id. at 426.
If there were frequent occasions in which the informer cannot disclose his basis
of knowledge without compromising his identity, the self-verifying detail substitute would
be necessary to protect the informer's privilege. But it is unlikely that there are many
such occasions; the only situation in which disclosure of the basis of knowledge would
compromise the informer's identity would be one in which he is the only person having
this basis of knowledge. And in such a situation, he would hesitate to inform at all
because the mere giving of the tip would compromise his identity.
43 See note 30 supra. Of course, the corroboration problem will not arise if previous
truthful tips establish the informer's past reliability.
41

42
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Spinelli indicated that independent corroboration of facts alleged in
the tip may establish the informer's truthfulness. Again, however, the
opinions are of minimal assistance in developing criteria for sufficient
corroboration.
Suppose U, an informer, explaining in detail how his information
was obtained, reports (1) that D is engaged in an illegal bookmaking
operation; (2) that D uses apartment 600 as his bookmaking office;
and (3) that D uses WAger 2-0007 and WAger 2-0008 to conduct his
bookmaking business. Here the police officer can satisfy the basis of
knowledge test but is unable to give the magistrate or a court any reason
for believing U to be honest or reliable.
It is doubtful that the purpose of the reliability test is satisfied
if the officer swears merely that police investigation has corroborated
the allegations relating to the apartment and the phone numbers.
Justice Harlan believed that four corroborated facts in Draper were
sufficient, but that corroboration of only one fact in the Spinelli tipthe phone numbers-was not. 44 The number of facts criterion, however,
is as unsuitable here as it is in the self-verifying detail context.
Whether the corroborated facts are circumstantially incriminating
or merely innocent is a more relevant criterion. Corroboration of
innocent facts, such as the apartment number and the telephone numbers, shows that the informer has some familiarity with the suspect's
affairs, but it does not suggest that those affairs include criminal
activity; a skillful liar would always allege some true innocent facts to
make his story appear credible. 4 5 Only corroboration of an incriminating allegation should be relevant.
The last hypothetical would be significantly altered if U, the informer of unknown reliability, were to allege an additional fact: On
busy days, D conducts his gambling business by five phones, the auxiliary numbers being WAger 2-0009, WAger 2-0010, and WAger 2-0011,
none of which is listed in the telephone book. If this information is
subsequently corroborated by police investigation, the tip becomes
more believable. Corroboration of the allegations of D's use of the
apartment and two listed telephones does not provide sufficient reason
to believe in the truthfulness of the allegation of D's bookmaking
activity; many people have two telephones. But five telephones in one
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969).
The danger of fabricated tips is certainly real. HARNE-Y AND CRoss, supra note 1.
written from the policeman's point of view, lists some of the usual motives for becoming
an informer: elimination of a competing racketeer, the possibility of a lighter sentence if
apprehended. revenge, a feeling of importance, and money obtained by "selling informa44
45
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apartment suggests a bookmaking operation.46 When this "incriminating" fact is corroborated, one can fairly conclude that the informer has
not fabricated his allegation that D was conducting a gambling
47
business.
CONCLUSION

Aguilar required that an affidavit for a warrant contain a statement of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informer
obtained his knowledge, and a reason for believing the informer
reliable. 48 The major question has been whether Aguilar must be
strictly followed. The common-sense or non-technical emphasis of
Ventresca produced uncertainty as to whether both Aguilar tests had
to be literally applied to each tip. That uncertainty should have been
dispelled by Spinelli's unequivocal demand that the informer's report
first be measured against the standards of Aguilar's twin-pronged test.
But Spinelli also provides for self-verifying detail as a valid substitute for passing the basis of knowledge test, and for independent
corroboration as a substitute for passing the reliability test. Courts will
46 See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969).
47 See Comment, supra note 89, at 843-44 n.22. Some additional corroboration problems can be dealt with briefly:
Corroborationby Another Tip. In the last hypothetical, if U's facts are not corroborated by police investigation but are repeated in a tip received from V, who is also of
unknown reliability, has U's tip now passed the reliability test? It is doubtful that one
untrustworthy tip can validate another. U and V could have jointly fabricated their
story for any number of reasons. See note 45 supra. If V is known to be reliable, however,
he probably could corroborate U's tip. Of course, if V's tip passes the Aguilar tests and
establishes the probability of criminal conduct, U's tip becomes unnecessary for probable
cause purposes.
Corroborationby IncriminatingFacts Not Alleged in the Tip. If U reports only two
telephone numbers, but independent police investigation reveals the three additional
numbers, U4 qllegation of gambling becomes believable. See Spinelli V. United States,
393 U.S. 418, 419 n.7 (1969).
Classes of Informers for Whom the Reliability Test Can be Relaxed. Ventresca
suggested that policemen are presumed to be reliable, and that an affiant policeman need
not give additional reasons for believing the report of another policeman. 380 U.S. at Ill.
In Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965), the Court distinguished informers in tax
fraud cases from informers in narcotics cases, "or other common garden varieties of
crime," and ruled that the former are exempt from the reliability test. Id. at 224. A statement that the informer is a policeman could provide a sufficient circumstance for believing
the informer reliable. But the mere fact that tax fraud is alleged should not exempt the
affiant from telling the magistrate why he believes his informer reliable. Id. at 231 (Goldberg, J., concurring and dissenting).
48 In a warrantless case, the arresting or searching officer must possess knowledge
of circumstances indicating the informer's basis of knowledge and his reliability. See notes
2 & 34 supra.
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now be confronted with the task of determining the extent to which
self-verifying detail and independent corroboration can be so employed.
It would have been preferable to adhere strictly to Aguilar, interpreted as denying the efficacy of self-verifying detail in the basis of
knowledge context, but permitting the corroboration of incriminating
facts to satisfy the reliability test. Aguilar is not unduly rigid. Given a
statement of some of the underlying circumstances relevant to each of
the two tests, magistrates and reviewing courts have ample room in
which to use common sense. So interpreted, Aguilar permits effective
utilization of the informer in law enforcement, while ensuring that the
knock at the door will come only with probable cause.
Henry S. Mather

